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When I read (and listen) to such comments from our leading central bankers, I can only scratch my head and ponder the degree to which they appreciate financial and economic history – including recent financial crises. Dr. Bullard’s paper suggests that the Japanese predicament of long-term substandard growth is the worst-case scenario for the U.S. economy. It is more likely the best-case.

And I find myself increasingly frustrated by the ongoing “inflation vs. deflation debate.” With today’s low level of consumer price inflation, those arguing that deflationary forces are the paramount systemic risk now dominate policy dialogue. Most tend to be inflationists. Most argue for additional stimulus and see little risk in such activist policymaking.

I see risks altogether differently. We are in the late-phase of a multi-decade historic Credit Bubble. The greatest risk at this point is that massive issuance of non-productive governmental debt foments a crisis of confidence at the very heart of our monetary system. The top priority must be to ensure that such a devastating outcome is avoided – and at significant unavoidable cost. It is imperative that we as a nation come to the recognition that real financial and economic pain must be endured to protect the long-term viability of our monetary system. The inflation rate is not the key issue. And efforts to try to inflate our way out of structural debt problems are a lost cause. We must instead move forcefully to rein in our deficits and avoid further debt monetization in order to protect the soundness of our money and Credit - or else risk a financial crash.

Most regrettably, Washington policymaking (fiscal and monetary) is on a trajectory that will inevitably destroy the creditworthiness of our nation’s vast liabilities. With ominous parallels to the mortgage/Wall Street finance Bubble, Federal Reserve policies have fostered Bubble dynamics throughout our Treasury, agency and debt markets, more generally. Instead of market dynamics working to discipline Washington’s profligate debt expansion, Federal Reserve interventions ensure that a distorted marketplace again accommodates perilous Credit excess. Our central bankers should heed Mr. Trichet’s warning. Additional quantitative ease will only fuel the Bubble and risk calamity.

When I read (and listen) to such comments from our leading central bankers, I can only scratch my head and ponder the degree to which they appreciate financial and economic history – including recent financial crises. Dr. Bullard’s paper suggests that the Japanese predicament of long-term substandard growth is the worst-case scenario for the U.S. economy. It is more likely the best-case.

And I find myself increasingly frustrated by the ongoing “inflation vs. deflation debate.” With today’s low level of consumer price inflation, those arguing that deflationary forces are the paramount systemic risk now dominate policy dialogue. Most tend to be inflationists. Most argue for additional stimulus and see little risk in such activist policymaking.

I see risks altogether differently. We are in the late-phase of a multi-decade historic Credit Bubble. The greatest risk at this point is that massive issuance of non-productive governmental debt foments a crisis of confidence at the very heart of our monetary system. The top priority must be to ensure that such a devastating outcome is avoided – and at significant unavoidable cost. It is imperative that we as a nation come to the recognition that real financial and economic pain must be endured to protect the long-term viability of our monetary system. The inflation rate is not the key issue. And efforts to try to inflate our way out of structural debt problems are a lost cause. We must instead move forcefully to rein in our deficits and avoid further debt monetization in order to protect the soundness of our money and Credit - or else risk a financial crash.

Most regrettably, Washington policymaking (fiscal and monetary) is on a trajectory that will inevitably destroy the creditworthiness of our nation’s vast liabilities. With ominous parallels to the mortgage/Wall Street finance Bubble, Federal Reserve policies have fostered Bubble dynamics throughout our Treasury, agency and debt markets, more generally. Instead of market dynamics working to discipline Washington’s profligate debt expansion, Federal Reserve interventions ensure that a distorted marketplace again accommodates perilous Credit excess. Our central bankers should heed Mr. Trichet’s warning. Additional quantitative ease will only fuel the Bubble and risk calamity.

For 2006-2009, real GDP decreased at an average annual rate of 0.2 percent; in the previously published estimates, the growth rate of real GDP was 0.0 percent. From the fourth quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2010, real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 0.2 percent; in the previously published estimates, real GDP had increased at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent.

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If indeed, the inventory cycle is behind us, then what we have on our hands is an underlying baseline trend in GDP of 1.2% at an annual rate. And if we are correct in our assumption that the looming withdrawal of fiscal stimulus at the federal level and the cutbacks at the state and local government level subtract 1.5% from growth in the coming year, then it begs the question: How exactly does the economy escape a renewed moderate contraction over the next four to six quarters, barring some unforeseen positive boost?